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STATE LAND USE LAWS AND REGIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
By George D. Brown*
INTRODUCTION
State governments have increasingly assumed a major role in a
matter which had been largely the province of local jurisdictions:
controlling the use of land. This phenomenon-frequently referred
to as "The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control"'-shows continu-
ing signs of vitality throughout the country as special study commit-
tees issue their reports and state legislatures debate the enactment
of land use statutes.2 This article focuses upon Massachusetts-a
state likely to join the ranks of the Quiet Revolution within the next
two years3-and upon the intergovernmental issues which have ari-
sen in the course of the land use debate within that state.
In Massachusetts, interest in new land use control systems has
converged with the movement toward new institutions at the re-
gional level. The state's Regional Planning Agencies have gained
significant new functions in recent years, 4 and some of these agen-
cies are likely to evolve into general purpose regional governments.
Enactment of new land use legislation can hasten the development
of regional institutions, if such legislation assigns significant respon-
sibilities to the regional level of government. At the 'same time, the
potential ability of regional institutions to play a major role in a
non-localized land use system is a factor in deciding whether to set
up such a system.
This article advances three general propositions for consideration
by the participants in the Massachusetts debate: 5
First, legislation should allocate significant responsibility to re-
gional (sub-state) entities, but should retain a substantial local role.
Development decisions should be made by local governments in the
first instance, with higher (state and regional) levels participating
in those decisions, or hearing appeals from them, or both.
Second, existing regional institutions are incapable of performing
most of the functions which such a system should allocate to the
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regional level. New regional institutions must be developed, with
particular emphasis on the need for visibility and political account-
ability, and consistent with the requirements of the one person-one
vote doctrine;
Third, statewide land use legislation need not be uniform in struc-
ture or operation across the state.
These propositions are advanced in the context of the Massachu-
setts debate. However, they may be of interest to policy-makers in
other states as well, for the debate over new land use laws is emerg-
ing as one of the most significant inter-governmental issues in the
history of our federal system.6
I. ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS AMONG LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
A. The American Law Institute Regulatory Categories.
Because any new land use system adopted in Massachusetts is
likely to be based on the regulatory concepts of the American Law
Institute's Model Land Development Code 7 a brief description of
these concepts is necessary at this point. While much of the Model
Code is devoted to strengthening the regulatory and planning capa-
bilities of local government," the premise of Articles Seven and
Eight is that there are certain land use decisions which cannot be
entrusted to an exclusively local system of regulation. These deci-
sions (estimated at approximately ten percent of all land use regula-
tory decisions9) affect interests other than local, which the local
political and governmental processes cannot be relied on to pro-
tect.10 Thus, local land use control is perceived as a function which
can create significant "externalities"; in other words, the "costs"
and "benefits" are not fairly distributed among all those who should
share in them."
The Code attempts to delineate the limited categories of land use
decisions in which supra-local interests are present. For these
categories the Code then establishes a non-local system of regula-
tion. This step is a frequent response to problems of externalities:
transfer of the function to a higher level of government." At the
same time, the Code preserves local control over the large majority
of land use decisions, in which no significant externalities are pres-
ent.
The first regulatory category in the Code's non-local system em-
bodies those areas where development might affect citizens of more
than just the locality in which a particular area is located. The Code
terms these "Areas of Critical State Concern.' 3 Such areas can be
identified in two principal sets of circumstances: first, when histori-
cal, natural or environmental resources "of regional or statewide
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importance"" are present; and second, when an area is "signifi-
cantly affected by, or has a significant effect upon, an existing or
proposed major public facility or other area of major public invest-
ment.' 1 5 An example of the first set of circumstances would be a salt
marsh used by migrating waterfowl; an example of the second would
be land around a proposed major airport.'"
The second category embodies those types of development which,
wherever they occur, are likely to have an effect upon the citizens
of more than one locality. The Code terms these "Development[s]
of Regional Impact."' 7 Such developments may be those of large
size, those which create substantial environmental problems, those
which attract large numbers of persons or vehicles, or those which
will generate additional development. 8 Supra-local interests are
potentially present in such cases, and the Code mandates applica-
tion of a complex cost/benefit analysis (weighing costs and benefits
for the locality and the region) to proposals for any such develop-
ment.9
These two regulatory categories are the foundation of Massachu-
setts' recently enacted Martha's Vineyard Land Use Law. 20 This
statute establishes a twenty-one-member regional commission. This
body passes on all applications to construct developments of re-
gional impact, defined, in part, as "the types of development which,
because of their magnitude or the magnitude of their effect on the
surrounding environment, are likely to present development issues
significant to more than one municipality of the island of Martha's
Vineyard."' 2' The regional commission also designates "district[s]
of critical planning concern," (similar to the Code's Areas of Critical
State Concern) and oversees local regulation of these districts.22
B. Is there a Role for Regional Organization in a System Based
on the ALI Model Code?
Having identified these two categories of land use decisions which
call for a different system of regulations than the norm of relatively
exclusive local control, the Model Code assigns responsibilities
within such a system to the state and local levels. The omission
of a significant role for regional governmental entities (other than
decentralization of state level entities) is not an oversight. "This
Code rejects the idea of creating another level of governmental
agency between the state government and the local governments. 123
The draftsmen's principal reason for this rejection seems to be a
belief that areawide agencies are inherently weak and highly suscep-
tible to "horse trading" among the component localities. Thus these
agencies cannot be entrusted with the mission of protecting the
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supra-local interests, whose inadequate consideration by localities
is the very reason for establishing the new system. 4
This reasoning, however, is not an argument against any role for
regional organizations per se, but only against a role for those organ-
izations incapable of discharging it. Indeed, the Model Code has
been sharply criticized for ignoring the emergence of regional bodies
which could be a key element of any new regulatory system. 5 There
are at least three reasons why a substantial regional component
should be built into a system based on the Model Code.
First, as the Code itself recognizes, the land use decisions in ques-
tion have regional implications. It is frequently the effect of a partic-
ular locality's decisions upon surrounding localities that brings the
new system into play. A recent analysis by the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations reached similar conclusions,
calling for a substantial regional or state role to curb the external
effects of local zoning.26
Second, a unified areawide approach to interrelated development
problems is desirable. Such a unified approach not only leads to
planning coordination (as between land use and transportation
planning, for example); it assigns responsibility for as many func-
tions as possible to a governmental entity that can balance
competing interests. 27
A third reason is the continuing vitality of the regionalism move-
ment itself. Significant new functions are being assigned to the
regional level,2 and new and evolving regional bodies are demon-
strating the organizational flexibility of middle-tier government.2 1
Whether for these or other reasons, the ALI-based proposals pend-
ing in Massachusetts, as well as the Martha's Vineyard Law, assign
substantial functions to the regional level."0 There is, however, disa-
greement as to the precise allocation of functions among levels of
government. Clearly, a range of options is available." The following
subsection represents one possible set of allocations, based on the
present status and likely evolution of regional institutions within
Massachusetts.
C. A Suggested Allocation of Functions12
1. Critical Areas
Regulation -of critical areas involves five general stages: definition
of critical areas; delineation of the methods of control which may
be applied to them; identification of specific areas; the establish-
ment of particular controls for specific areas; and the application of
these controls to individual development decisions. Responsibility
for these stages should be allocated among levels of government in
396
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the following way.
The definition of areas of critical concern is largely a matter for
the state level. This determination is the fundamental policy deci-
sion as to what types of areas may present supra-local considera-
tions. Such a decision should be made by the state legislature in its
capacity as representative of the entire body politic. The legislature
might act by a detailed statute spelling out the different types of
critical areas, or by a more general statute which would be imple-
mented by more detailed state agency regulation. The use of a state
agency reflects the role of the state government as guardian of all
interests. However, it may be desirable to allow regions to define
additional critical areas, as long as their definitions are consistent
with the underlying state legislation and are approved at the state
level."
The general delineation of permissible methods of control would
be a task for the state legislature, analogous to the passage of a
zoning enabling act."
The identification of specific critical areas presents the most diffi-
cult issues. The author believes that this function should be as-
signed to regional agencies, provided that they are properly consti-
tuted. Because this is the most important step in the process, for
any supra-local interests, it should not be left to the localities. At
the same time, the system under analysis here is not "end state"
masterplanning imposed from the top down. The regional level, if
the relevant institution is constituted in a politically accountable
manner, provides opportunities for the accommodation of local de-
sires as well as protection for supra-local interests. 5
There may be instances where state level designation of particular
critical areas is necessary. For example, an impoverished region
might wish to encourage substantial tourist development in a valua-
ble natural area, even at the risk of damaging the area.3
At the same time that it designates a specific critical area, the
regional agency should issue guidelines for the local government's
regulation of that area, indicating what types of development
should be allowed and what types should be restricted or prohibited.
The Model Code and proposals based on it provide for such guide-
lines to be issued at this point. 7 These guidelines represent essen-
tially a statement of what supra-local interests may be present, and
what steps should be taken to protect them.
After this point the local government's responsibility becomes
paramount, with the promulgation of specific regula-
tions-analogous to a zoning ordinance or by-law-for the desig-
nated area. There is some room for local choice, since the designa-
tion is accompanied by guidelines, rather than mandatory regula-
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tions. Local control will be further enhanced by having the local
government enforce the regulations for the designated critical area,
just as it enforces its other land use controls."
Under this allocation of functions the higher levels of government
have identified a specific task for the local government to perform
along generally indicated lines. The higher levels must also be avail-
able as checks in the event that the local level does not carry out
its task. The regulations for a specific area must be reviewed for
conformity with the guidelines. This would seem to be the responsi-
bility of the regional agency, since that agency made the basic pol-
icy choice which the guidelines reflect. It may also be desirable to
provide for an administrative appeal from local decisions applying
the regulations. 9 Consideration of such appeals would seem to call
for a quasi-judicial body, and such an entity would seem best cre-
ated at the state level by gubernatorial appointment."
2. Developments of Regional Impact.
Regulation of developments of regional impact involves three gen-
eral stages: definition of developments of regional impact; delinea-
tion of the methods of control to be applied to them; and application
of the controls to individual development decisions. Responsibility
for these stages should be allocated among levels of government in
the following way.
Definition of such developments is largely a matter for the state
level, for the same reasons as in the case of critical areas, with some
room for regional variation. A fifty unit motel may well be of greater
regional impact in the Berkshires than in downtown Boston.
Also a matter of state responsibility is the establishment of the
tests to be applied to proposed developments of regional impact.
The state not only identifies these proposals as different from or-
dinary development proposals; it mandates a special set of rules to
be applied to them. These rules may require a set of environmental
and related findings, like the Vermont "Act 250 Criteria,"', or a
cost/benefit analysis like that envisaged in the Model Code.4" A
uniform set of rules across the state would be desirable since the goal
is a balance between local desires and the protection of other than
local interests. Local values will still assert themselves in the man-
ner in which the rules are applied.4 3
There is widespread disagreement over which level of government
should actually apply the rules for developments of regional impact
to specific applications for permits to build such developments.
Both the Model Code and the Florida statute provide for local deci-
sion on the application, subject to administrative review at the state
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level." In Massachusetts, however, the Martha's Vineyard Law and
most pending statewide proposals place this responsibility at the
regional level. 5 The premise seems to be that local governments will
not adequately consider the potential supra-local interests present
in these development decisions even when they are directed to and
are told how to do it. 46
Assigning this function to the local level is strongly preferable. To
begin with, it is consistent with the general Massachusetts intergov-
ernmental approach of local regulatory power exercised under the
overriding supervision of a higher level (generally the state) .47 The
Anti-Snob Zoning Law 8 and the Wetlands Protective Law49 are
relevant precedents in the land use field, and, indeed, served as
precursors of the ALI Model Code. 0
A second reason is that supra-local interests can be considered at
all stages of the process. The first two stages-definition of develop-
ments of regional impact and establishment of special rules for
them-are state-level actions designed to identify the presence of
supra-local interests and to mandate their consideration in specific
ways. The regional entity should participate in the local permit
decisions, acting as an advocate for the "regional perspective."'"
The regional entity should also have standing to appeal any local
decision to a quasi-judicial state body." Properly constructed and
enforced, a system which makes local government "think region-
ally" should work.
A third reason for local decisions in these cases is concern for the
mechanics of the permit process. A system in which one level of
government decides all the issues in one proceeding should save
time and also be responsive to builders' desire for a "one-step"
permit system. It may also avoid the "triggering" question which
arises when a higher level applies the development of regional im-
pact procedures separately from the local government's application
of its own requirements. At what point should the development of
regional impact proceedings begin-before the local government
acts at all, after the issuance of conditional local permits, or after
all local approvals have been received?53
As indicated, this assignment of functions would be consistent
with the Model Code, which is at the basis of most Massachusetts
proposals. 4 It is not primarily the allocation issue, however, which
has prevented the development of a consensus on division of respon-
sibilities among the state, regional and local levels. The principal
impediment has been the obvious inability of the proponents of land
use reform to agree on what regional entities to use.
399
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II. REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Existing Institutions.
1. Counties
Counties in Massachusetts are not as significant a level of govern-
ment as they are in other parts of the country.5 Essentially, they
function as arms of the state government, discharging certain res-
ponsibilities over courts, the penal system, agriculture, registries of
deeds, highways and miscellaneous services." New functions have
not, as a rule, been assigned to the counties.- Indeed, some func-
tions have been taken away from them. 8 Additional governmental
responsibilities at the regional level have generally been assigned
either to the regional planning agencies or to newly created regional
entities."
Except perhaps in some rural areas,6 the county is not a viable
unit of government in Massachusetts, and certainly not one to
which significant responsibilities in land use should be assigned.
County government is in disrepute, partly because of questionable
political practices and partly because the structure, consisting of
three elected County Commissioners, has provided neither
accountability nor visibility."
Proposals for county change in Massachusetts have ranged from
outright abolition to dramatic restructuring and reform.12 In some
parts of the state, county government will probably wither away
and be absorbed by other levels. In other parts of the state, how-
ever, it may join forces with the regional planning agencies to be-
come a true middle tier government. 3
2. Regional Planning Agencies
The Regional Planning Agencies (RPA's) are well on the way to
becoming the dominant regional institutions in Massachusetts.
There are 12 such agencies, ranging in size from Franklin County
with 60,000 people to the gigantic Metropolitan Area Planning
Council (MAPC), which contains 101 communities and over 2 mil-
lion people. 4 Some were established under a generai enabling stat-
ute. 5 Others were established by special laws, either varying the
general statute slightly, or establishing a unique form of organiza-
tion for a particular region. The regional planning agencies are ex-
amples of confederal regional bodies. For purposes of intergovern-
mental analysis, they can be classified as generally similar to a
Council of Governments (COG)."
The norm established by Chapter 40B, the general enabling
statute, is representation of each constituent municipality by a
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member of its planning board. There are substantial variations,
however, including joint appointment of one member by the local
governing body and the planning board87, appointees of both the
local governing body and the planning board68, and appointees of
the local governing body only.69 The Metropolitan Area Planning
Council includes 20 members appointed by the Governor, and
twenty representatives of state agencies, public authorities and the
city of Boston, as well as a representative of each constituent com-
munity.70
In most RPA's, each constituent municipality has the same num-
ber of representatives and votes. However, the makeup of the Cen-
tral Massachusetts Regional Planning District Commission repre-
sents an attempt to correlate size with voting power.71 Every com-
munity is represented by one member chosen by the planning board
from among its members. Each community over 8,000 is entitled to
a second voting member, appointed by the local governing body,
while each community over 15,000 is entitled to a third voting mem-
ber, appointed by the planning board. Each community over 50,000
is entitled to a fourth voting member, appointed by the local govern-
ing body. Provision is also made for alternate and ex officio mem-
bers.7 1
The statutory powers of the regional planning agencies are largely
advisory. They are to make studies of the "resources, problems,
possibilities and needs" of their districts, and are to prepare a "com-
prehensive plan of development" (or a "schematic study plan")
which shall include "recommendations for the physical, social, gov-
ernmental or economic improvement of the district as in their opin-
ion will be in the best interest of the inhabitants of the district." 73
This significant responsibility is somewhat diminished, however, by
the admonition that "such plans and recommendations shall be
advisory only.""
At times the regional planning agencies have bemoaned their ad-
visory status and their lack of "clout". 75 On paper, at least, these
agencies appear to conform to the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations' lukewarm description of COG's as "essen-
tally a device for incremental local adaptation to changing needs
... [a] procedural effort at balancing local independence and
areawide interdependence. '76 In fact, under the aegis of the national
government and with help from a favorable state administration,
the RPA's have become a major force.7
The federal government has helped finance the operations of the
RPA's through grants-in-aid.78 It has also enhanced their import-
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ance to member communities through the "A-95" review process,
which requires that a regional agency review and comment upon
local applications for federal funds under a wide variety of pro-
grams." Most important, however, is the regional planning agen-
cies' role in federal grant programs which require planning on the
regional level as a condition of state eligibility for funds."0
Transportation planning provides a good example of this develop-
ment. The RPA's function jointly with state transportation agencies
to furnish the regional planning component required by federal
law."' During 1973, RPA's received approximately $500,000, under
contracts from the state Department of Public Works, for the per-
formance of this function." In addition, recent Massachusetts legis-
lation creating a statewide network of regional transportation au-
thorities indicates that the RPA's will probably be the planning
arms of these entities.8 3
Potentially even more important, for those participating, is the
designation of regional planning agencies as the "single representa-
tive planning organizations" under section 208 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. 4 As of this writing, nine RPA's have been
designated to perform this function. 5 The "208" planning agencies
have major tasks to perform, including the identification of
treatment works necessary to meet the anticipated needs of their
areas, establishment of construction priorities, and development of
a program to "regulate the location, modification and construction
of any facilities within such area which may result in any discharge
in such area.""
Taken together these developments amount to a dramatic
strengthening of the role of the RPA's. Although their comprehen-
sive plans are not binding, their functional plans are shaping public
and private decisions. Some Massachusetts RPA's may become
"Umbrella Multi-Jurisdictional Organizations," that is, area-wide
quasi-governments with substantial planning control over the oper-
ation of other governmental units. 7
In greater Boston, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council may
become the foundation for a true regional government. A number
of proposals along these lines have been advanced within the past
year." The absorption of the preexisting RPA into the newly created
Martha's Vineyard Commission may also be a step in this direc-
tion. 9 At any rate, the present status and possible evolution of the
RPA's is a major consideration in the development of any new sys-
tem of land use control in Massachusetts.
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B. Regional Institutions with Land Use Responsibilities-the
Proposed Options.
The land use proposals under discussion in Massachusetts assign
regional responsibilities to a wide variety of entities. The institu-
tional options proposed may be grouped into three categories.
The first category takes the regional planning agencies-either in
their present form or with some modifications-and assigns land use
responsibilities to them. Thus House Bill 644 establishes a special
procedure for "developments of regional impact," along the lines
recommended above, and directs that the relevant RPA prepare and
submit to the local government considering a permit application for
such development "a report and recommendations on the regional
impact of the proposed development."" The report covers a broad
spectrum of factors, including the proposed development's effect on
the environment and public facilities, and the extent to which
"[t]he development will have a favorable or unfavorable impact on
the health, safety and morals of the residents of affected municipali-
ties."'" Apparently drawing on the Florida system, the bill requires
that the local government consider whether the proposal is consis-
tent with the regional agency's report. 2 Legislative proposals of
prior years have given more substantial regulatory authority to the
regional planning agencies. 3
A second category of proposals creates new regional entities, and
assigns them substantial roles in land use control. These entities are
separate from, but closely related to, existing regional bodies. Thus
House Bill 3907, the most frequently cited statewide bill, establishes
twelve "Regional Resource Committees" with the same boundaries
as the existing RPA's. Each Committee would consist of eleven
members, "six to be chosen by the Regional Planning Commission
"from among its own members, and five members to be appointed
by the Governor."9 The Committees are to designate "areas of criti-
cal planning concern," and regulate proposals for "developments of
regional impact."9 In other proposals the new entities are elective,"
or a combination of elective and appointive."
A third category of proposals creates new, general purpose re-
gional governments, and includes land use responsibilities among
their functions. The strongest interest in this approach appears to
be focused on the greater Boston area." However, the proponents of
one such proposal have indicated that it can- be applicable in other
metropolitan areas.9
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C. Choosing Among the Options-3 Criteria.
Presented with this bewildering array of options, legislators might
well be tempted to conclude that no optimum solution is possible,
and that the only wise course of action is to refer the matter to
further "study." However, choices among the competing institu-
tional alternatives can, and should, be made now, and there are
three criteria which should guide those choices.
1. Regional institutions with land use responsibilities should be
politically accountable.
The regional functions recommended in this article carry with
them substantial power over the way in which a given region will
develop and the uses to which its land will be put. The designation
of critical areas, along with the basic policy decisions about permis-
sible development (guidelines), and intervention in local regulatory
proceedings as advocate of the regional interest represent more than
technical "planning" responsibilities. These activities represent
planning with substantial power to implement the policies devel-
oped. An entity exercising such power should be responsible to the
electorate in identifiable ways.'
Direct election of those who exercise this power is one way of
satisfying this criterion' Appointment by an authority, such as the
Governor, which is itself directly responsible to the electorate is
another.' Appointment by municipal officials of local representa-
tives to a regional body does not satisfy this criterion, however.
Responsibility even for individual appointments may be diffused
under such an arrangement, and there is no single election at which
the hypothetical regional constituency can express itself.
At the same time, however, representation of local governmental
units by members of these units may serve other values important
to a regional organization. The support of the local governmental
units may be important to the regional entity's on-going work, and
may well have been a political prerequisite to its formation.' If the
local representatives are themselves local officials, their expertise
may be a valuable contribution.'
One acceptable solution may be the creation of mixed elective-
appointive bodies, an approach which has been hailed as the most
promising form of regional entity.' Certainly in Massachusetts, the
Martha's Vineyard Law provides a highly relevant precedent. Re-
gional land use responsibilities are performed by a twenty-one mem-
ber commission, seventeen of whose members have voting power.
Nine members are elected at an island-wide election, with each of
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the six towns guaranteed a representative; six are representatives of
the individual town governments; one is a county commissioner
chosen by the commissioners; one is a member of the state Cabinet
appointed by the Governor; and the four non-voting members are
non-resident taxpayers appointed by the Governor." 8
The evolution of the Martha's Vineyard legislative proposal is
particularly instructive in this respect. An early proposal circulated
for comment provided for no elected members. The Commission
would have been composed entirely of representatives of local and
county governments and of gubernatorial appointees.11 By the time
former Governor Sargent filed the proposal in August of 1973, six
elected members had been added in place of local government repre-
sentatives. ' However, these "elected" members were to be chosen
at the annual town meetings. When the Governor re-filed his pro-
posal in March of 1974, it provided for the Commission in its present
form. ' The result is a politically accountable body, the first
election of whose members was hotly contested. At the same time,
the existing governments have a substantial voice in its operations,
as does the state government.
2. The regional responsibility for land use should not be assigned
to a single purpose unit divorced from the performance of other
regional functions.
The land use policies which will be made at the regional level are
closely related to other important planning and resource manage-
ment decisions carried out, at least in part, at the regional level.
These include comprehensive planning, and functional planning
activities such as transportation planning, water quality planning,
and air quality planning. '
These decisions should not be made in isolation from each other.
Coordination is necessary at the technical level so that, for example,
transportation planning does not call for development of an area
where environmental planning is aimed at curbing development.
Coordination is also necessary at the fundamental policy-making
level. These decisions involve the consideration of competing inter-
ests, and should be made by a body responsible for balancing these
interests."'
3. Regional institutions with land use responsibilities must be con-
stituted in accordance with the requirements of the one person-one
vote doctrine.
The impact of the one person-one vote doctrine upon the future
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of local governmental bodies, especially regional institutions, has
frequently been analyzed."1 Although there is little precedent avail-
able on the relevance of the doctrine to regional land use agencies," 3
the likely development of such agencies may well direct the atten-
tion of courts to such organizational questions as well as to the
inevitable challenges by landowners to the underlying regulatory
techniques applied. 4 Furthermore, there is evidence of increasing
court challenges of the makeup of existing areawide agencies.'
Analysis of recent judicial decisions suggests three guidelines which
may be of assistance to policymakers in a state like Massachusetts,
which is considering a substantial regionalization of land use res-
ponsibilities.
The first guideline is that the one person-one vote rule does not
apply to appointive land use regulatory bodies. This was the holding
in People ex rel. Younger v. Dorado County,"' in which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court relied on Sailors v. Board of Education.,7 In the
latter case the United States Supreme Court upheld the Michigan
system of establishing county boards of education. Validly elected
local school boards each sent a delegate to a county meeting where
the assembled delegates elected the county board. Every delegate
had one vote, even though they represented local school boards of
varying sizes. The Court held that this system was "basically
appointive," and that a state could choose to appoint local officials
of a "non-legislative" character whose duties are administrative
rather than legislative "in the classical sense.""'
Analysis and application of the Sailors decision presents two main
problems. First, it is frequently hard to distinguish between "ad-
ministrative" and "legislative" functions at the local governmental
level. Critics have pointed out that this problem was present in the
case of the county board at issue in Sailors,' and the Court itself
has moved away from the administrative-legislative distinction as
a useful test.' 0 It is probably accurate to say that any local govern-
mental body (including regional land use entities), other than the
local legislative body itself, can be validly constituted through the
appointive process.
The second, and more difficult, problem under Sailors is deter-
mining which bodies are elective and which are appointive. It has
been argued that Sailors itself involved an indirect election system,
and that the power of the larger communities' voters was invalidly
diluted.'2 ' This argument is potentially present in every case where
a confederal body is composed of constituent communities of differ-
ent sizes, each one of which has equal voting power in the body. This
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argument prevailed in Bianchi v. Griffing.12" There, each town in the
county elected a town supervisor who also sat as his town's "dele-
gate" on the county board of supervisors. Although Sailors was in-
voked as justifying this system, the Second Circuit struck it down.
"The mandate of the equal protection clause cannot be effectively
circumscribed by a local legislative body with general governmental
powers .. . simply by labeling [its] members 'delegates.' ",, The
test seems to be whether local voters in electing a particular local
official are, at the same time, "electing" their community's repre-
sentative to the confederal body."4 If this is the case, then the one
person-one vote rule applies to the higher level as well.
The second guideline is that if regional entities performing the
land use functions recommended in this article do contain elected
members, those members must be elected in accordance with the
requirements of the one person-one vote rule.
When the one person-one vote rule was first applied to local gov-
ernment, the Supreme Court was urged to extend it to all local
government units whose members were elected from districts, ir-
respective of the functions performed by any particular unit.25 The
Court, however, left open the question by suggesting that some
elected bodies might be exempt."6 The extent of any such exception
seemed quite narrow after Hadley v. Junior College District.12 7 How-
ever, in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District 21 the Court did find an exempt body, and, in the process,
gave some vitality to the exception. The Court upheld a system of
governance for California's water storage districts, which limited
the franchise to landowners and gave each owner voting power in
proportion to the value of land held. The Court applied a two-part
test to determine whether an exemption was warranted: first, did
the district have a "special limited purpose", with other than "nor-
mal governmental authority;" second, did its operations "dispro-
portionately affect different groups?" The Court found both tests
satisfied. It stressed the fact that the districts did not provide "gen-
eral public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utili-
ties, roads, or anything else.of the type ordinarily financed by a
municipal body," and that its water storage and flood control activi-
ties were paid for by, and mainly of benefit to, landowners.1 29
The Court never explained why it felt a need to draw a line, nor
why the two-part test enunciated was the guidepost for determining
on which side of the line a particular local unit should be placed.
Perhaps the majority was simply applying traditional equal protec-
tion analysis in the determination of whether the California struc-
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ture was "not rationally based." 3 ' The disproportionate effect of the
districts' operations on different groups might be relevant to the
question of whether to permit a differential in voting power of those
groups. However, this -is only the second half of the test. Why limit
this inquiry to those situations where the unit does not "exercise
what might be thought of as 'normal governmental' authority?" The
answer may be a value judgment that all general purpose and simi-
lar units of governments have a sufficient impact upon the lives of
citizens that those units must be constituted in accordance with the
fundamental principles of democratic government enunciated in the
reapportionment cases,13' even if a differential impact might be
provable in particular cases. 132
The test enunciated in Salyer will prove difficult to apply,'33 but
it will almost certainly lead to other decisions holding local govern-
mental units exempt from the requirements of the one person-one
vote rule. Both of these points are illustrated by the recent decision
of the Second Circuit in Education/Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore."' In
that case the court denied the validity of a challenge upon one
person-one vote grounds to a Council of Governments in the Greater
Hartford area. The COG in question has duties generally similar to
those of Massachusetts RPA's. Thus it is charged with formulating
non-binding comprehensive plans, and with rendering technical as-
sistance to member municipalities. The Council can also issue re-
ports on the compatibility between regional plans and proposed
municipal plans."'
The principal ground for finding the one person-one vote rule
inapplicable, in both the District and the Circuit Court, was that
the Council performed "essentially advisory and non-govern-
mental" functions. Both courts purported to rely on Salyer,"' but
neither court applied the two-part test enunciated in that opinion.
Rather, the case seems to stand for the proposition that since
advisory bodies do not exercise governmental power over anyone the
requirements of democratic government do not apply to the manner
in which they are constituted. 37
The dissenting judge argued persuasively that the COG's powers
should not be determined solely from its authorizing state statute.
He pointed to the extensive role which the Council played in the
planning and administration of federal grant-in-aid programs."18
The same analysis could be applied to Massachusetts RPA's and to
Councils of Government throughout the country. Unquestionably,
therefore, the Education/Instruccion decision is a setback for those
who have argued that such bodies, if elected, must be constituted
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in accordance with the one person-one vote rule.13
However, the author believes that the elected members of the
regional entities contemplated in this article would be subject to the
rule. The land use responsibilities of these entities, apart from oth-
ers which might be assigned to them, would be sufficient to bring
the rule into play. First, under the recommended allocation of func-
tions, regional entities would have sufficient regulatory power and
ability to implement their plans to take them out of the category of
"advisory" units established by Education/Instruccion. Second, the
power to designate critical areas and to determine how they are to
be regulated (including the power to issue regulations if the regional
entity disapproves of proposed local regulations) is sufficiently simi-
lar to the "typical governmental powers" of municipalities"' that
the first half of the Salyer test would not be met. Third, these land
use activities affect many different groups, not just landowners.
Indeed, it is the desire to ensure protection of all potentially affected
interests that would lead to creation of any such regional entity.
This conclusion may seem to be at variance with the oft-cited
need to encourage flexibility in the structure of regional govern-
ments. 11 However, the conflict is resolved by the third guide-
line-namely, that the one person-one vote rule permits a wide
variety of representational structures, and that representation of
constituent muncipalities can be provided even in the context of
substantial population differentials.
The formation of a regional entity with power involves the ceding
of some powers presently exercised by local government units. These
units may be more willing to cede that power, and the resultant
working relationships between levels may be more harmonious, if
the local units are assured representation as units on the regional
entity.' One of the major challenges confronting the designers of
new areawide institutions has been the development of a govern-
mental structure which could combine a regional outlook with polit-
ical legitimacy in the eyes of the constituent municipalities.' The
policymakers' dilemma has been to satisfy these considerations
without coming "dangerously close to [the argument] rejected in
Reynolds, that sparsely populated counties deserve representation
without regard to population so that their views can be heard."'4
Dusch v. Davis"' provides an indication of the most promising
way out of this dilemma. That case involved the consolidation of a
city and its neighboring county into one municipality consisting of
seven boroughs. At issue was a representation system for the city
council, known as the "Seven-Four plan." Four members were
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elected at large, without regard to residence. The remaining seven
were also elected at large, but with the provision that each of the
seven boroughs must be represented. There was a substantial dis-
parity in size among the boroughs."6 The Court held that since all
voters had an equal power of choice this residence requirement did
not invalidate the system.
The decision has been criticized. 4 It is true that, under this sys-
tem, citizens of the large boroughs may be forced to elect councilors
they otherwise might not have.' However, the system is a reasona-
ble and workable attempt at encouraging the election of borough
representatives with a citywide perspective, and is seen by most
commentators as a promising solution to the metropolitan di-
lemma. "
Although Dusch v. Davis may be the most helpful source of flexi-
bility, it is not the only one. The designers of regional institutions
should also give some consideration to the substantial variations in
size which may be permitted among the representative districts of
an elected regional body with representation by districts. In Abate
v. Mundt,'5 the Supreme Court, over a vigorous dissent, permitted
a variation of 11.9 percent in a system designed to ensure that each
town would have at least one representative on a county legislative
board."' The Court seems to have moved toward permitting greater
population disparity in representative districts at the local level
than at the state level, just as a higher degree is permissible at.the
state legislative level than at the Congressional district level."'
Abate, however, has its obvious limitations. It would not, for exam-
ple, have permitted single district election of one member per mu-
nicipality to the Martha's Vineyard Commission without creating
a substantially larger body.153
D. Regional Institutions-Two Recommendations.
The application of these criteria-accountability, integration
with other functions, and constitutionality-suggests that substan-
tial changes should be made in many of the proposals currently
under discussion in Massachusetts. For example, the Regional Re-
source Committees proposed in House Bill 3907 do not satisfy the
criterion of accountability. Six of the eleven members would be
appointed by the Regional Planning Agencies, bodies which are not
themselves politically accountable. The Regional Resource Com-
mittees also appear to be single purpose bodies, although they
would, presumably, work closely with the RPA's.
On the other hand, the Franklin County Land Use Proposal seems
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to satisfy both criteria. The need for accountability is met through
the election of twenty-six of the twenty-nine members."' Although
the Commission created under this proposal would be, strictly
speaking, a single purpose entity, the draft mandates a close rela-
tionship between it and the county regional planning agency, and
provides that the County's plan will ultimately become the control-
ling factor in the Commission's regulatory operation. '55 However,
the allocation of one representative to each town in the county
would seem to violate the constitutional requirements analyzed
above. 5'
None of the regional functions recommended in this article should
be assigned to the RPA's in their current form. An exception might
be made for intervention in local proceedings considering proposals
for "developments of regional impact."'5 7 Certainly the RPA would
be a more suitable advocate of the "regional interest," and its views
would be entitled to more weight, if the agency were constituted by
a process reasonably geared to reflect that interest. However, even
as presently constituted, the RPA's can contribute technical plan-
ning expertise to individual permit decisions by, for example, pre-
paring regional impact statements considering the potential impact
of the development on the region."5 Furthermore, intervention in
local proceedings might be a step toward the allocation of greater
responsibilities to more broadly based entities."9
These criticisms, however, should not be taken as a dismissal of
the proposals currently under discussion. Taken together, they show
a high degree of concern for the problem of developing a new institu-
tional structure, and point to ways in which that development
might come about. Building upon the excellent work that has been
done,'6 ' the author would like to suggest two possible structures.
1. Accountable regional planning agencies with some elected
members
The approach here is not to assign regional land use functions to
entities separate from the RPA's, but to integrate these functions
with the existing responsibilities of the RPA's, and to reconstitute
these bodies in a politically accountable way. The Martha's Vine-
yard Law is a relevant example of this approach. The statute abol-
ishes the existing RPA (the Dukes County Planning and Economic
Development Commission), and transfers its functions to the newly
created Martha's Vineyard Commission."' This solution enhances
the interrelationship between the planning functions already per-
formed by regional planning agencies and the newly created regional
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land use functions. The structure of the Martha's Vineyard Com-
mission, combining elective and appointive members, would satisfy
the other criteria of political accountability and constitutionality.
This approach may -well be replicable in other parts of the state.
There are some indications that the RPA's themselves would sup-
port it. ' Certainly this approach helps solve a dilemma which has
been of great concern to planners: the conflict between their desire
for more binding and authoritative planning and the need for gov-
ernmental policy to emanate from a body with governmental legiti-
macy. 63
Proposals for mixed elective-appointive bodies are under consid-
eration in the current session of the Legislature."' There is strong
interest nationwide in the development of such bodies as the most
promising form of regional entity."' In Massachusetts, the current
prominence of the land use issue may well provide the impetus
needed to take this significant institutional step.
2. New general purpose entities at the regional level
In some areas of the state it may be possible to go even further,
and to create viable, general purpose regional governments with
substantial responsibilities for the performance of areawide func-
tions including land use. Since general purpose government is an
ideal forum in which to resolve competing claims for resource alloca-
tion and in which to make overall policy choices,"'6 this may well be
the optimum approach for satisfying the three criteria advanced in
this article. There are two distinct ways in which this development
may come about in Massachusetts: the establishment of a new re-
gional government for the greater Boston area, and the transforma-
tion of county government in some rural areas into a new form of
regional entity.
Three proposals for a new metropolitan entity in greater Boston
are under serious discussion." 7 Two out of the three assign to the
new entity land use functions similar to those discussed in this
article. A major unresolved issue is the nature of the governing body.
The author believes that a combination of elected members and
state government appointees, such as that proposed by the Greater
Boston Chamber of Commerce, 6 ' is more responsive to the criterion
of political accountability than a governing body composed of exist-
ing municipal officials. 69 Perhaps the uncertainty over how far to
go in this direction stems from the fact that a clear choice has not
been made between a general purpose metropolitan government and
a supervisory entity without substantial operating responsibilities.
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In other parts of the state, restructured counties might combine
with the Regional Planning Agencies to form significant regional
entities."' Certainly, the regional land use functions suggested here
should be part of the responsibilities of such entities."' Once again,
land use questions may help trigger the process.
3. Boundaries
The question of boundaries for new regional entities has not yet
emerged as a matter of significant dispute in Massachusetts. All
proposals for greater Boston build on the existing Metropolitan Area
Planning Council, despite its large size. In the rest of the state
problems may arise in attempts to combine counties and RPA's in
those cases where their boundaries are not the same. There are some
"logical" areas in which this is not a problem. Moreover, the whole-
sale reform of county government would probably involve a substan-
tial redrawing of boundaries in any event.1 2 The problem perhaps
does not arise at all when the option chosen is that of developing
the existing RPA into a more accountable entity.
m. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM SYSTEM
The land use debate in Massachusetts is frequently couched in
terms of whether or not one favors the enactment of "state" legisla-
tion. A source of confusion is the fact that this word is used in
several senses: legislation emanating from the state government;
regulation at the state level; and regulation across the entire state.
Thus one element of the debate is whether any system that is
adopted should be imposed "statewide." But even this question is,
in reality, two questions: first, should a system of supra-local land
use control be adopted for the entire state; second, should that
system be uniform in all parts of the state?
A. Whole State Coverage.
The premises behind the serious consideration of a new land use
control system for Massachusetts suggest that any such system
should cover the whole state. Supra-local concerns are potentially
present in a wide variety of development decisions. It is true that
some regions of the state may have more critical areas than others,
or may be more drastically affected by developments of regional
impact. The argument here, however, is that supra-local interests
should be protected whenever they arise (recognizing that no system
will do this perfectly), unless creation of the system to protect them
is harmful to other values in such a way that its "costs" (either the
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costs of setting it up or the costs of operating it) outweigh its "bene-
fits" in regions of the state where it is little used. Hopefully the
system presented here does not entail substantial "costs;" that is,
it can be designed and operated so that it is not destructive of local
control, does not cripple economic activity, and does not create a
new and otherwise unnecessary level of institutions.
Certainly, the ALI Model Code seems to establish a whole-state
system. 7 3 This is also true of many of the states which have enacted
new land use control systems in recent years."' However, a state
might conclude that only certain portions of it "need" a non-local
control system.1 5 Coastal Zone Management is the strongest exam-
ple of this approach.
There is a substantial possibility that Massachusetts will reject
the "whole state" approach, and will enact one or more non-local
systems for different portions of the state. The 1974 enactment of a
special system for Martha's Vineyard may be a precedent in this
direction. The Vineyard legislation was presented, in part, as a
"model" or "pilot" for the rest of the state,"' but it may be a model
for a segmented system with some regions not included at all.
There are two reasons why the state Legislature might take this
approach. First, it might conclude that a particular region "needs"
a special land use control system, for example in areas where signifi-
cant natural resources may be threatened by development pres-
sures.177 Enactment of a Coastal Zone Management system would
also embody this approach.
The second reason would be a conclusion that a particular area
"wants" a special land use control system. For example, the Mar-
tha's Vineyard legislation was enacted only after a favorable vote in
a non-binding island-wide referendum. A particular region's desire
for such legislation might be deduced from the fact that state legis-
lators from the area filed legislation, or that a regional institution
supported it. One technique which is likely to be used is the passage
of a land use bill for a particular region, subject to a local acceptance
by popular vote.78
There are strong arguments on both sides of the issue. However,
if the Legislature accepts the premises behind a non-local system
in the first place, such a system ought to cover the whole state. In a
sense, the system proposed here could be regarded as the necessary
minimum to protect supra-local interests wherever they may arise.
If needed, special protection for particular areas or types of develop-
ment could be added.
Although the local option may seem like a natural compromise,
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especially to legislators, it should be rejected. A principal function
of the state legislature is to protect interests which the political
process at lower levels may not protect."'9 Once the Legislature con-
cludes that these interests are present-actually or potentially-in
a region, it should not give that region the option of not protecting
them.
B. Statewide Uniformity
Those "whole state" systems which do exist in the United States
are uniform in the sense that the same set of institutions operate
everywhere within the boundaries of each state. It should be noted,
however, that in decentralized systems the various regional agencies
may approach their duties somewhat differently. 8 ' There is no rea-
son why a uniform structure is necessary. Different institutions in
different parts of the same state may be employed to protect the
same set of interests. The middle tier structure suitable for a large
metropolitan area such as greater Boston may differ greatly from
the institution which evolves in a large rural county such as Berk-
shire, which would, in turn, be different from the Martha's Vineyard
Commission.
The values inherent in local autonomy can be advanced by letting
each region evolve, to some extent, as it "wishes." The ultimate
state (and "statewide") legislation might even contain a series of
''regional options." A "standard form" of middle tier institution
could be established as the norm, with each region given the oppor-
tunity to devise its own variant and to adopt it in a regional referen-
dum. "'81 The state would have to play some role in delineation of
boundaries, in the first instance, and would have to retain some
power of approval over any region's alternate choice. In particular
cases, such as the creation of a metropolitan government for Boston,
specific state legislation would be necessary.
The value of regional differentiation can be advanced in another
way: by varying the extent of regulatory activities performed at the
regional level. Under the system proposed, the functions assigned to
the local level remain constant: adoption of regulations for critical
areas; enforcement of these regulations; and enforcement of the
standards governing developments of regional impact. At the re-
gional level, however, assignment of functions might depend on the
capability of the different regional institutions to perform them. All
functions not assigned to the regional level would be performed at
the state level.
A significant feature of this system is that it can be set into
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motion at once, and as various regional institutions evolve, new
duties can be assigned to them. This might work as follows: Area
"A" has not developed an appropriate regional structure. Critical
areas are designated at the state level, with assistance from the
existing RPA, and the state reviews proposed local regulations, and
adopts its own if these are inadequate. The RPA intervenes in local
development of regional impact proceedings. Area "B" has devel-
oped an appropriate regional institution as outlined above. This
regional agency performs the functions of designation and review of
critical areas, which the regional agency in area "A" is not ready to
undertake. An important effect of this approach will be to hasten
the development of regionalism in area "A", since the alternative
of state performance of the function will be seen as a lessening of
"local control."
IV. CoNFoRMrrY WITH FEDERAL LAND USE LAws-A NOTE
The strong possibility that Massachusetts will enact statewide
land use legislation will be further enhanced by the passage of a
National Land Use Policy Act. 82 Furthermore, Massachusetts is
already participating in the Coastal Zone Management Act,", and
has thus committed itself to developing new land use controls for a
substantial portion of its territory. Any statewide land use legisla-
tion should attempt to comply with the likely provisions of a na-
tional bill, and the system should be integrated with the Coastal
Zone Management Plan. State legislation based on the ALI regula-
tory categories should satisfy the requirements of both federal pro-
grams, although the Coastal Zone Management Act appears to re-
quire more extensive regulation of uses than the national land use
proposals.'84
The institutional structure and allocation of responsibilities rec-
ommended in this article would also comply with the likely require-
ments of both programs. However, one caveat should be noted. The
Martha's Vineyard Commission is an institutional model, but the
absence of any appeal from its decisions to a state-level administra-
tive body may limit this statute's value as a procedural model. The
"Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act" which passed the
Senate in 1973 gives the states a choice, at the stage of implement-
ing an ALI-based land use program, between:
(1) implementation by general purpose local governments pursuant to
criteria and standards established by the State, such implementation
to be subject to State administrative review with State authority to
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disapprove such implementation whenever it fails to meet such criteria
and guidelines; and (2) direct state land use planning and regulation.'1
The first alternative would seem to require case by case review at
the state level, as opposed to periodic reviews of compliance. The
Martha's Vineyard Law does not provide for such review. Nor does
that statute satisfy the second alternative. The new Commission is
a regional body, (indeed, one which might comply with the Senate
bill's definition of "general purpose local government""'8 ) rather
than a state level entity.
The institutional structure proposed in this article avoids this
problem by providing for state-level administrative appeal, priniar-
ily as an additional check to ensure the protection of all interests
potentially present in critical areas and in developments of regional
impact. The conformity of this approach with likely federal legisla-
tion is an additional reason for adopting it.
CONCLUSION
Massachusetts is still in what might be called the "process" stage.
However, the process may be nearing its completion, and the enact-
ment of significant new land use legislation may become a reality.
Such legislation will not come about until the institutional ques-
tions raised in this article are resolved. Yet these questions can be
answered, and from the answers can come not only land use legisla-
tion, but also the new regional institutions which Massachusetts
reformers have sought to bring about.
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